

Andrew Secure RPC

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Summary: Exchanged of a fresh shared key. Symmetric key cryptography.

Protocol specification (in common syntax)

```
A, B :      principal
Kab, K'ab :  symkey
Na, Nb, N'b : nonce
succ :      nonce -> nonce

1.  A -> B :  A, {Na}Kab
2.  B -> A :  {succNa, Nb}Kab
3.  A -> B :  {succNb}Kab
4.  B -> A :  {K'ab, N'b}Kab
```

Description of the protocol rules

This protocol establishes the fresh shared symmetric key $K'ab$. The nonce $N'b$ is sent in message 4 to be used in a future session.

We assume that initially, the symmetric keys Kab is known only to A and B.

Requirements

The protocol must guaranty the secrecy of the new shared key $K'ab$: in every session, the value of $K'ab$ must be known only by the participants playing the roles of A and B.

The protocol must guaranty the authenticity of $K'ab$: in every session, on reception of message 4, A must be ensured that the key $K'ab$ in the message has been created by A in the same session.

References

[Sat89]

Claimed attacks

[BAN89]. The message 4 contains nothing that A knows to be fresh. Hence, an intruder I can replay this message in another session of the protocol to convince B to accept an old compromised key.

i.1.	A	->	B	:	A, {Na}Kab
i.2.	B	->	A	:	{succNa, Nb}Kab
i.3.	A	->	B	:	{succNb}Kab
i.4.	B	->	A	:	{K'ab, N'b}Kab
ii.1.	A	->	B	:	A, {Ma}Kab
ii.2.	B	->	A	:	{succMa, Mb}Kab
ii.3.	A	->	B	:	{succMb}Kab
ii.4.	B	->	I(A)	:	{K''ab, M'b}Kab
ii.4.	I(B)	->	A	:	{K'ab, N'b}Kab

See also

BAN modified Andrew Secure RPC, BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC, Lowe modified BAN concrete Andrew Secure RPC.

Citations

[BAN89] Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi, and Roger Needham. A logic of authentication. Technical Report 39, Digital Systems Research Center, february 1989.

[Sat89] M. Satyanarayanan. Integrating security in a large distributed system. *ACM Transactions on Computer Systems*, 7(3):247–280, 1989.